Home › Guides › eMudhra trust-store patch tracker
✓ checked 23 October 2026 · sources: Cisco Talos advisory (21 Oct), PyPI and pypistats, Mozilla OneCRL, NVD, go.dev, nodejs.org, mitmproxy changelog, curl.se · method · caveats · download the data
Eight intermediate certificates issued by the Indian certificate authority eMudhra had private keys weak enough to recover, according to Cisco Talos. Browsers blocked the six TLS ones first. Since then Go, Node.js, Python’s certifi, Red Hat and mitmproxy have shipped their own fixes, and certifi has changed its mind twice in five days.
compromised intermediates: 8 (6 TLS)certifi roots: 121 → 117 → 120 → 118certifi downloads last month: 1,286,781,208
What Talos reported
Cisco Talos published its advisory on 21 October 2026. It says a key-generation ceremony on 30 April 2025, under eMudhra’s emSign Root TLS CA – G3 and emSign Root CS CA – G3, produced weak P-384 keys that were then used for eight intermediate CA certificates: six for TLS (EV, OV and DV, for eMudhra BV and eMudhra Inc) and two for code signing. Anyone holding one of those keys could issue certificates that clients trusting the chain would accept. Talos says eMudhra has revoked the certificates and stopped issuing under its G3 root, and that it had seen no malicious use in the wild as of 21 October, 14:00 UTC.
Browsers are not the main worry. Talos names proxies, reverse load balancers, VPN clients and gateways as software that may carry its own trust store or skip revocation checks, and so may need an update. That is the reason for this tracker: proxy and TLS-inspection software usually trusts whatever bundle it ships with.
Who has patched, and when
| Date | Component | Change | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 Oct 2026 | Mozilla (Firefox, NSS) | Six OneCRL revocation entries for eMudhra-issued intermediates, timestamped 22:00 UTC (6 PM ET). curl’s cacert.pem, extracted from Mozilla data as of 20 Oct, keeps only emSign Root CA – G1 of the four emSign roots. | Mozilla OneCRL (Remote Settings), curl.se/ca |
| 18 Oct 2026 | Python certifi 2026.10.18 | Removed all four emSign roots: 121 roots down to 117. | PyPI, GitHub certifi/python-certifi #437 |
| 19 Oct 2026 | Go 1.27.3 and 1.26.10 | crypto/x509 refuses chains containing the eight compromised intermediates (CVE-2026-111943). | go.dev release history, NVD |
| 20 Oct 2026 | Python certifi 2026.10.19 | Restored three emSign roots it judged unaffected (G1, C1 and ECC C3); emSign ECC Root CA – G3 stays out. 120 roots. | PyPI, GitHub #440 |
| 21 Oct 2026 | Node.js 26.12.1 | Security release: “tls: reject chains containing blocked public keys” (PR #66871) and root certificates updated to NSS 3.131.1. | nodejs.org release notes |
| 21 Oct 2026 | Red Hat ca-certificates | CVE-2026-114406: Red Hat removes the root CAs that signed the weak intermediates, because not every client can distrust a single intermediate. | NVD, Red Hat errata |
| 22 Oct 2026 | mitmproxy 12.3.0 | Removes eMudhra CAs from the trust list in its precompiled binaries, and adds test options that sign with a compromised key. | mitmproxy CHANGELOG |
| 23 Oct 2026 | Python certifi 2026.10.23 | Removed emSign Root CA – C1 and emSign ECC Root CA – C3 again, matching Mozilla’s current list. 118 roots; only emSign Root CA – G1 remains. | PyPI, GitHub #445 |
Dates are release or publication dates as each source gives them. Tracker as of 23 October 2026.
The approaches differ. Go and Node.js block the eight intermediates by the hash of their public key, because neither reads Firefox’s OneCRL revocation list or Chrome’s CRLSet. Red Hat goes further and removes the issuing roots, since clients that read the system store cannot block a single intermediate. Red Hat’s CVE record links 9 errata. Mozilla added 6 OneCRL entries for the TLS intermediates on 17 October; OneCRL now holds 1,907 entries in total.
Python certifi went back and forth
certifi copies Mozilla’s root list for Python programs, including the requests library, and was downloaded 1,286,781,208 times from PyPI in the last month. Its four releases tell the story: it dropped all four emSign roots on 18 October, put three back on 20 October, and on 23 October removed two of them again, matching the curl bundle built from Mozilla’s data as of 20 October. A Python program pinned to certifi 2026.10.19 still trusts emSign Root CA – C1 and emSign ECC Root CA – C3.
| certifi version | Roots | emSign Root CA – G1 | emSign ECC Root CA – G3 | emSign Root CA – C1 | emSign ECC Root CA – C3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026.7.22 | 121 | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| 2026.10.18 | 117 | no | no | no | no |
| 2026.10.19 | 120 | yes | no | yes | yes |
| 2026.10.23 | 118 | yes | no | no | no |
Counts of certificates in certifi/cacert.pem in each wheel on PyPI.
mitmproxy, the open-source TLS-intercepting proxy, ships its own trust list in its standalone binaries. Version 12.3.0 removed the eMudhra CAs on 22 October. The PyPI package, downloaded 3,516,981 times last month, depends on certifi instead. For more on how TLS stacks diverge, see our post-quantum TLS split, and for flaws in proxy and VPN gateways, the proxy gateway CVE ledger.
Method
We downloaded each certifi wheel from PyPI and counted the certificates and labels in cacert.pem, and took download counts from pypistats.org on 23 October 2026. We read the OneCRL changeset from Mozilla’s public Remote Settings server and counted entries whose issuer name contains emSign. CVE records come from the NVD API, Go release dates from go.dev, the Node.js change from its 26.12.1 release notes, the mitmproxy change from its changelog, and the curl bundle from curl.se. We did not test any software against the certificates.
Caveats
- This is not a complete list. Java, Windows, Apple, Android, Debian, Alpine and appliance vendors each have their own trust stores and timetables.
- A patched library helps only once the software that bundles it is rebuilt and redeployed. Containers and appliances often lag.
- The technical account of the flaw is Talos’s. eMudhra’s own statement is not quoted here.
- Download counts include automated CI installs.
Download the data
- Patch tracker (CSV).
- emSign roots in each certifi release (CSV).
Cite as: ProxyPicker, “eMudhra Certificate Compromise: Who Has Patched Their Trust Store”, 23 October 2026, https://proxypicker.com/emudhra-trust-store-patch-tracker/.
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