Proxies in MITRE ATT&CK v20

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✓ checked 18 October 2026 · source: MITRE ATT&CK® Enterprise v20.0 and v19.2 (STIX data from MITRE’s cti repository) · method · caveats · download the data

42 of the 178 threat groups in MITRE ATT&CK’s Enterprise knowledge base (23.6%) are linked to its Proxy technique or one of its sub-techniques. ATT&CK v20, released on 13 October 2026, also added a campaign in which, MITRE writes, attackers tasked an AI coding agent with using a residential proxy.

groups using Proxy 42software using Proxy 102ATT&CK entries mentioning residential proxies 7

Headline numbers

  1. 42 groups, 102 pieces of software (12.1% of 842) and 17 of 57 campaigns are linked to Proxy (T1090) or its sub-techniques in v20. In v19.2 the figures were 41, 99 and 16. The one newly linked group is Salt Typhoon.
  2. Renting servers is more common than any single proxy sub-technique. 19 groups are linked to renting virtual private servers (T1583.003), up from 16. Multi-hop Proxy, which covers chains of proxies including onion-routing networks such as Tor, has 13.
  3. Hijacked network devices appear too. 5 groups and 6 campaigns are linked to compromising network devices for infrastructure (T1584.008), the technique that covers routers and similar devices taken over to support further attacks.
  4. Entries mentioning residential proxies rose from 3 to 7. All 4 new ones belong to C0064, the only campaign added to Enterprise in v20.

Proxy-related techniques

Threat groups linked to each technique, ATT&CK v20 EnterpriseProxyProxy: 2020Proxy: Internal ProxyProxy: Internal Proxy: 99Proxy: External ProxyProxy: External Proxy: 1111Proxy: Multi-hop ProxyProxy: Multi-hop Proxy: 1313Proxy: Domain FrontingProxy: Domain Fronting: 11Protocol TunnelingProtocol Tunneling: 1515Virtual Private ServerVirtual Private Server: 1919Network DevicesNetwork Devices: 55Hide InfrastructureHide Infrastructure: 22
Active (not revoked or deprecated) Enterprise groups with a “uses” relationship to each technique. Source: MITRE ATT&CK v20.0.
IDTechniqueGroups v20Software v20Campaigns v20Groups v19.2
T1090Proxy20481019
T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy92349
T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy1113211
T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy1323812
T1090.004Proxy: Domain Fronting1401
T1572Protocol Tunneling1522715
T1583.003Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server190716
T1584.008Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices5064
T1665Hide Infrastructure2332

Protocol Tunneling (T1572) and Hide Infrastructure (T1665) aren’t sub-techniques of Proxy, but they cover related ways of hiding where traffic comes from, so we list them for comparison. The headline counts above use only Proxy and its four sub-techniques.

The AI-assisted campaign

MITRE describes C0064, the “AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico’s Government Infrastructure”, as a campaign in which “human operators used Claude Code AI and OpenAI GPT GPT-4.1 AI to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, privilege escalation, discovery, credential harvesting, and exfiltration operations”. It dates the activity from December 2025 to February 2026.

In the campaign’s technique entries, MITRE writes that “the adversary utilized a legitimate residential proxy provider for C2 communications” and that “the adversary tasked Claude Code to utilize a residential proxy”. The proxy entries sit under External Proxy (T1090.002), Web Service (T1102), Establish Accounts (T1585) and Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services (T1583.006). MITRE adds that “due to the breadth of this campaign, public reporting only provides select details”.

The other residential-proxy mentions predate v20: the general descriptions of Acquire Infrastructure and Hide Infrastructure, and an APT29 entry. For proxy networks built on infected home devices and how they were disrupted, see our residential proxy botnet timeline. For the routers and firewalls behind T1584.008, see edge devices in CISA’s exploited-vulnerabilities list.

Groups linked to Proxy techniques

GroupATT&CK IDProxy techniques (v20)
APT28G0007T1090.002, T1090.003
APT29G0016T1090.002, T1090.003, T1090.004
APT3G0022T1090.002
APT39G0087T1090.001, T1090.002
APT41G0096T1090
Blue MockingbirdG0108T1090
Cinnamon TempestG1021T1090
Contagious InterviewG1052T1090
CopyKittensG0052T1090
Earth LuscaG1006T1090
Ember BearG1003T1090.003
FIN13G1016T1090.001
FIN4G0085T1090.003
FIN5G0053T1090.002
Fox KittenG0117T1090
GALLIUMG0093T1090.002
Gamaredon GroupG0047T1090, T1090.003
HigaisaG0126T1090.001
InceptionG0100T1090.003
LAPSUS$G1004T1090
Lazarus GroupG0032T1090.001, T1090.002
LeviathanG0065T1090.003
Lotus BlossomG0030T1090.001, T1090.003
Magic HoundG0059T1090
Medusa GroupG1051T1090.003
menuPassG0045T1090.002
MirrorFaceG1054T1090
MoustachedBouncerG1019T1090
MuddyWaterG0069T1090, T1090.002
POLONIUMG1005T1090
Salt TyphoonG1045T1090, T1090.003
Sandworm TeamG0034T1090
Scattered SpiderG1015T1090
ShinyHuntersG1057T1090.003
SilenceG0091T1090.002
StriderG0041T1090.001
Tonto TeamG0131T1090.002
TurlaG0010T1090, T1090.001
Velvet AntG1047T1090.001
Volt TyphoonG1017T1090, T1090.001, T1090.003
WindigoG0124T1090
ZIRCONIUMG0128T1090.003

To see which network an address belongs to, including well-known hosting and proxy ranges, use our proxy checker.

Method

We downloaded the Enterprise STIX bundles for ATT&CK v20.0 and v19.2 from MITRE’s cti repository on GitHub on 18 October 2026. We counted active objects (not revoked or deprecated): 178 groups, 842 pieces of software and 57 campaigns in v20, matching MITRE’s release notes for Enterprise. A group, piece of software or campaign counts for a technique if it has an active “uses” relationship to it. Residential-proxy mentions are active objects whose description contains “residential proxy” or “residential proxies”. A separate script recounts everything from the saved files.

Caveats

  • ATT&CK records what public reports describe. A group with no Proxy link may still use proxies; MITRE says ATT&CK doesn’t enumerate all possible behaviours.
  • Groups and campaigns are MITRE’s groupings based on published reporting; attribution in those reports is the reporters’.
  • Changes between versions can reflect MITRE adding reporting, not changes in attacker behaviour.
  • We counted the Enterprise domain only, not Mobile or ICS.

Download the data

© 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Licence: MITRE grants a non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to use ATT&CK for research, development and commercial purposes; see the ATT&CK terms of use.

Cite as: ProxyPicker, “Proxies in MITRE ATT&CK v20”, 18 October 2026, https://proxypicker.com/mitre-attack-proxy-techniques/. Data: MITRE ATT&CK v20.0.

Related: Residential proxy botnet timeline · Edge devices in CISA’s exploited-vulnerabilities list · Proxy checker.

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