Home › Guides › Proxies in MITRE ATT&CK v20
✓ checked 18 October 2026 · source: MITRE ATT&CK® Enterprise v20.0 and v19.2 (STIX data from MITRE’s cti repository) · method · caveats · download the data
42 of the 178 threat groups in MITRE ATT&CK’s Enterprise knowledge base (23.6%) are linked to its Proxy technique or one of its sub-techniques. ATT&CK v20, released on 13 October 2026, also added a campaign in which, MITRE writes, attackers tasked an AI coding agent with using a residential proxy.
groups using Proxy 42software using Proxy 102ATT&CK entries mentioning residential proxies 7
Headline numbers
- 42 groups, 102 pieces of software (12.1% of 842) and 17 of 57 campaigns are linked to Proxy (T1090) or its sub-techniques in v20. In v19.2 the figures were 41, 99 and 16. The one newly linked group is Salt Typhoon.
- Renting servers is more common than any single proxy sub-technique. 19 groups are linked to renting virtual private servers (T1583.003), up from 16. Multi-hop Proxy, which covers chains of proxies including onion-routing networks such as Tor, has 13.
- Hijacked network devices appear too. 5 groups and 6 campaigns are linked to compromising network devices for infrastructure (T1584.008), the technique that covers routers and similar devices taken over to support further attacks.
- Entries mentioning residential proxies rose from 3 to 7. All 4 new ones belong to C0064, the only campaign added to Enterprise in v20.
Proxy-related techniques
| ID | Technique | Groups v20 | Software v20 | Campaigns v20 | Groups v19.2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1090 | Proxy | 20 | 48 | 10 | 19 |
| T1090.001 | Proxy: Internal Proxy | 9 | 23 | 4 | 9 |
| T1090.002 | Proxy: External Proxy | 11 | 13 | 2 | 11 |
| T1090.003 | Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy | 13 | 23 | 8 | 12 |
| T1090.004 | Proxy: Domain Fronting | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
| T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | 15 | 22 | 7 | 15 |
| T1583.003 | Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server | 19 | 0 | 7 | 16 |
| T1584.008 | Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices | 5 | 0 | 6 | 4 |
| T1665 | Hide Infrastructure | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
Protocol Tunneling (T1572) and Hide Infrastructure (T1665) aren’t sub-techniques of Proxy, but they cover related ways of hiding where traffic comes from, so we list them for comparison. The headline counts above use only Proxy and its four sub-techniques.
The AI-assisted campaign
MITRE describes C0064, the “AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico’s Government Infrastructure”, as a campaign in which “human operators used Claude Code AI and OpenAI GPT GPT-4.1 AI to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, privilege escalation, discovery, credential harvesting, and exfiltration operations”. It dates the activity from December 2025 to February 2026.
In the campaign’s technique entries, MITRE writes that “the adversary utilized a legitimate residential proxy provider for C2 communications” and that “the adversary tasked Claude Code to utilize a residential proxy”. The proxy entries sit under External Proxy (T1090.002), Web Service (T1102), Establish Accounts (T1585) and Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services (T1583.006). MITRE adds that “due to the breadth of this campaign, public reporting only provides select details”.
The other residential-proxy mentions predate v20: the general descriptions of Acquire Infrastructure and Hide Infrastructure, and an APT29 entry. For proxy networks built on infected home devices and how they were disrupted, see our residential proxy botnet timeline. For the routers and firewalls behind T1584.008, see edge devices in CISA’s exploited-vulnerabilities list.
Groups linked to Proxy techniques
| Group | ATT&CK ID | Proxy techniques (v20) |
|---|---|---|
| APT28 | G0007 | T1090.002, T1090.003 |
| APT29 | G0016 | T1090.002, T1090.003, T1090.004 |
| APT3 | G0022 | T1090.002 |
| APT39 | G0087 | T1090.001, T1090.002 |
| APT41 | G0096 | T1090 |
| Blue Mockingbird | G0108 | T1090 |
| Cinnamon Tempest | G1021 | T1090 |
| Contagious Interview | G1052 | T1090 |
| CopyKittens | G0052 | T1090 |
| Earth Lusca | G1006 | T1090 |
| Ember Bear | G1003 | T1090.003 |
| FIN13 | G1016 | T1090.001 |
| FIN4 | G0085 | T1090.003 |
| FIN5 | G0053 | T1090.002 |
| Fox Kitten | G0117 | T1090 |
| GALLIUM | G0093 | T1090.002 |
| Gamaredon Group | G0047 | T1090, T1090.003 |
| Higaisa | G0126 | T1090.001 |
| Inception | G0100 | T1090.003 |
| LAPSUS$ | G1004 | T1090 |
| Lazarus Group | G0032 | T1090.001, T1090.002 |
| Leviathan | G0065 | T1090.003 |
| Lotus Blossom | G0030 | T1090.001, T1090.003 |
| Magic Hound | G0059 | T1090 |
| Medusa Group | G1051 | T1090.003 |
| menuPass | G0045 | T1090.002 |
| MirrorFace | G1054 | T1090 |
| MoustachedBouncer | G1019 | T1090 |
| MuddyWater | G0069 | T1090, T1090.002 |
| POLONIUM | G1005 | T1090 |
| Salt Typhoon | G1045 | T1090, T1090.003 |
| Sandworm Team | G0034 | T1090 |
| Scattered Spider | G1015 | T1090 |
| ShinyHunters | G1057 | T1090.003 |
| Silence | G0091 | T1090.002 |
| Strider | G0041 | T1090.001 |
| Tonto Team | G0131 | T1090.002 |
| Turla | G0010 | T1090, T1090.001 |
| Velvet Ant | G1047 | T1090.001 |
| Volt Typhoon | G1017 | T1090, T1090.001, T1090.003 |
| Windigo | G0124 | T1090 |
| ZIRCONIUM | G0128 | T1090.003 |
To see which network an address belongs to, including well-known hosting and proxy ranges, use our proxy checker.
Method
We downloaded the Enterprise STIX bundles for ATT&CK v20.0 and v19.2 from MITRE’s cti repository on GitHub on 18 October 2026. We counted active objects (not revoked or deprecated): 178 groups, 842 pieces of software and 57 campaigns in v20, matching MITRE’s release notes for Enterprise. A group, piece of software or campaign counts for a technique if it has an active “uses” relationship to it. Residential-proxy mentions are active objects whose description contains “residential proxy” or “residential proxies”. A separate script recounts everything from the saved files.
Caveats
- ATT&CK records what public reports describe. A group with no Proxy link may still use proxies; MITRE says ATT&CK doesn’t enumerate all possible behaviours.
- Groups and campaigns are MITRE’s groupings based on published reporting; attribution in those reports is the reporters’.
- Changes between versions can reflect MITRE adding reporting, not changes in attacker behaviour.
- We counted the Enterprise domain only, not Mobile or ICS.
Download the data
- Proxy-related techniques (CSV): groups, software and campaigns per technique in v20.0 and v19.2.
- Groups linked to Proxy techniques (CSV): 42 groups with their Proxy sub-techniques.
© 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Licence: MITRE grants a non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to use ATT&CK for research, development and commercial purposes; see the ATT&CK terms of use.
Cite as: ProxyPicker, “Proxies in MITRE ATT&CK v20”, 18 October 2026, https://proxypicker.com/mitre-attack-proxy-techniques/. Data: MITRE ATT&CK v20.0.
Related: Residential proxy botnet timeline · Edge devices in CISA’s exploited-vulnerabilities list · Proxy checker.
Press & data requests: email [email protected] for interviews, the raw data behind this page, or corrections. See also our contact page.