Tor Use in Azerbaijan After the Social Media Restrictions

Home › Guides › Tor Use in Azerbaijan After the Social Media Restrictions

✓ checked 27 October 2026 · source: Tor Metrics (Tor Project), estimated users by country · method · caveats · download the data

Estimated Tor use in Azerbaijan rose 70% above its usual level the day after TikTok, Instagram and X were reported restricted there. Tor Metrics estimates 2,415 daily users connected directly to the Tor network from Azerbaijan on 13 October 2026, against an average of 1,419 a day from 1 September to 10 October. By 25 October the figure had fallen back to 1,518.

Peak, 13 October: 2,415Usual level: 1,419 a dayDays above Tor’s expected range: 5

What happened

On 12 October 2026 the internet monitor NetBlocks said its metrics showed restrictions to TikTok, Instagram and X on multiple internet providers in Azerbaijan, amid protests over rules on headscarves in schools. AFP reported the same day that users could reach some platforms only through VPNs, and that police had announced 37 arrests linked to the unrest. The authorities did not confirm a block, according to the BBC’s Russian service.

Estimated daily Tor users in Azerbaijan connecting directly to relays, 1 to 25 October 202610-0110-01: 1,0661,06610-0210-02: 1,1031,10310-0310-03: 1,1141,11410-0410-04: 1,1391,13910-0510-05: 1,2031,20310-0610-06: 1,1181,11810-0710-07: 1,1531,15310-0810-08: 1,3271,32710-0910-09: 1,2971,29710-1010-10: 1,2951,29510-1110-11: 1,5791,57910-1210-12: 2,2062,20610-1310-13: 2,4152,41510-1410-14: 1,9111,91110-1510-15: 1,8961,89610-1610-16: 1,7351,73510-1710-17: 1,9321,93210-1810-18: 1,8351,83510-1910-19: 1,8231,82310-2010-20: 1,5251,52510-2110-21: 1,4681,46810-2210-22: 1,6041,60410-2310-23: 1,6151,61510-2410-24: 1,6901,69010-2510-25: 1,5181,518
Estimated daily users connecting directly to Tor relays from Azerbaijan. Orange bars are from 12 October, the day restrictions were reported. Source: Tor Metrics, The Tor Project (CC0).

The numbers

  • A jump over two days. Estimated users went from 1,295 on 10 October and 1,579 on 11 October to 2,206 on 12 October and 2,415 on 13 October.
  • Outside the normal range. Tor Metrics publishes an expected range for each day, used to spot possible censorship events. On 13 October the top of that range was 1,684. Users went above the range on 5 days in October, all between 12 and 17 October.
  • Still higher two weeks on. From 12 to 25 October the average was 1,798 a day, 27% above the earlier level. The figure for 25 October was 7% above it.
  • Bridges barely moved. Users connecting through Tor bridges, which help where Tor itself is blocked, averaged 137 a day before and 145 after. That suggests Tor itself stayed reachable, and people used it to reach blocked platforms.

The October rise is small next to a surge in December 2025, when Tor Metrics estimated up to 11,321 daily users from Azerbaijan. We did not find a reported cause for that surge.

Daily figures, 8 to 25 October

DateRelay usersTor’s expected rangeBridge users
2026-10-081,327749–1,518169
2026-10-091,297911–1,687152
2026-10-101,295938–1,486183
2026-10-111,579827–1,790156
2026-10-122,206932–1,794176
2026-10-132,415878–1,684180
2026-10-141,911883–1,579153
2026-10-151,896947–1,803121
2026-10-161,735834–1,792139
2026-10-171,932926–1,907154
2026-10-181,8351,042–2,260150
2026-10-191,8231,370–2,926136
2026-10-201,5251,268–2,995138
2026-10-211,4681,151–2,420148
2026-10-221,6041,246–2,289131
2026-10-231,6151,141–2,193138
2026-10-241,6901,185–2,145136
2026-10-251,5181,170–1,972136

Tor network figures for other countries are in our Tor exit network page. For how people got around a larger shutdown, see Iran’s blackout in Chrome and Wikipedia data and Snowflake requests from Iran.

Method

We downloaded Tor Metrics’ daily estimates of users by country for Azerbaijan (relay users with the expected range, and bridge users) on 27 October 2026. The latest day available was 25 October. The “usual level” is the mean of the 40 days from 1 September to 10 October 2026. Percentages compare daily estimates with that mean.

Caveats

  • Tor Metrics figures are estimates based on directory requests, not counts of people. One person can count more than once, and automated clients count too.
  • The rise lines up in time with the reported restrictions, but the data cannot show why any user connected.
  • Many people in Azerbaijan used VPNs instead, according to AFP and the BBC. VPN use does not show up in these figures.

Download the data

Cite as: ProxyPicker, “Tor Use in Azerbaijan After the Social Media Restrictions”, 27 October 2026, https://proxypicker.com/tor-users-azerbaijan/. Data: Tor Metrics, The Tor Project.

Press & data requests: email [email protected] for interviews, the raw data behind this page, or corrections. See also our contact page.